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Roadmap
• Side channel attacks and fault attacks
– Is DFA really a threat? When? 
– What can we do in the lab?
• State of the art for DES 
• Theory vs. practice, what is the right conclusion…
• Less faults => more cryptanalysis effort!
• Algebraic attacks on symmetric ciphers.
• How to recover keys in the hardest possible cases: 
• for example with only 1 fault in an inner round?Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Side Channel AttacksFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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SPA AttacksFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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DPA Attacks
Right 6 bits Wrong 6 bitsFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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DFA Attacks…
1. Provoke faults in the device,
2. Deduce the key by detailed mathematical 
analysis.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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DFA Requirements
One needs to be able to run the same crypto algorithm many 
times with the same inputs. 
The inputs do NOT need to be known.
• they usually are, but today we will realistic example when they 
aren’t (!) and yet the key is found.
DFA requires 
⇒a DETERMINISTIC crypto process with a known output
(from which the attacker wants to extract the secret key)
Examples when this happens: Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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GSM SIM card Authentication
A3 A3
Ki Ki
challenge RAND
SIM card
Signed RESponse (SRES)
are = ?
• RUN GSM ALGORITHM
Example:             A0 88 00 00 10 XX …………….XX
16 bytes random nonce
no L_e, no data in reply 
expected, result will be visible 
in the status bytes = 0x9F Le
both 0 INS CLAFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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In Contrast – 3G USIM Cards
No DFA attack, because 
• the base station is authenticated first!
• the SQN should be checked for freshness.
– so the card should never accept to do the same 
crypto computation twiceFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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In Contrast – MiFare Classic
The reader is authenticated first !
No DFA attack unless card random repeats 
￿ Fixed in “MiFare Plus” version (2009).
tag random 32 bits
tag resp. 32 bits
encr. rdr random  +  rdr resp. 2x32 bits
card ID 32 bitsFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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In Contrast – Bank Cards
Assuming ATC is always incremented => Session Key depends on ATC => 
Impossible to get the same cryptogram twice => DFA is impossible!
64 64
112 IMK
Session Key
ATC ATC
? ?
16 16Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Conjecture:
Maybe DFA attacks are feasible in practice  
only when
the industry uses
BAD PROTOCOLS ?
which can be fixed…Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Fault AttacksFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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DFA Attacks…
Part 1: Provoke Faults of “suitable type” (Fault Model)
Part 2: Exploit Faults = cryptanalysis techniques
Cost:
Part 1: what is hard and costly is the lab work. 
Part 2: frequently the cryptanalysis part is relatively easy (e.g. 
using simple differentials), or costs little, or requires small 
computing power.
One can expect that this is going to change in the future. Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Who Wins? 
Attackers or 
Defenders?Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Security Evaluation at RFI Global
• Penetration testing of embedded systems.
– software attacks
– reverse-engineering
– side-channel attacks
– physical attacks
– etc..
• Routinely done as a part of formal evaluation schemes 
such as EMVCo, PCI/PED, and other. 
• RFI Global has extracted numerous symmetric and 
asymmetric keys…
– and results are not published
• due to strict non-disclosure contracts.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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As a Proof Of Concept
Results presented today are obtained on a readily available 
smart card XXXXXX 
based on a modern micro-controller.
We don’t claim that this card is the strongest on the market.
Proof of concept work: 
showing that DFA on DES is possible on some smart cards.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Key Question:
We don’t want to try ALL possible ways to achieve a glitch.
• can learn, discover a way to get there through stages?Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Lab Work (1)
• Voltage glitch applied close to the final round. 
• Triggers ATR - defensive behaviour, attack detected.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Lab Work (2)
VERY STRANGE.
Now even without any glitch, the card will reset, 
the defensive behaviour pervades for many hours(!).Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
e-Smart 22/09/2010 21
Lab Work (3)
We have discovered ways of doing a glitch which produces an 
abnormal behaviour, BUT not defensive, no reset, the card 
does not detect anything abnormal.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Lab Work (4)
Further investigations allow to do reproduce this abnormal but 
not-defensive behaviour in a predictable way.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Lab Work (5)
In this way with further refinements and experimentation it was 
possible to discover parameters inducing a glitch in a middle 
round, where the card carries on the DES computation 
normally (giving a faulty ciphertext).Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Lab Work (6)Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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How Good It Can Get?
1000 runs:
never detectedFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Consecutive Faults?    
Done 5 consecutive faults
with precise timing 
and consistent perturbation type:Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Lab Work – Any Questions?
mailto: david.ware@rfi-global.comFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Part 2.
Cryptanalysis!Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Plausible Future of Fault Attacks
Don’t think that Lab work will become easier, on the contrary. 
But precisely because it will become VERY DIFFICULT to 
obtain faults, 
=> researchers now have to deploy more efforts on Part 2, 
recover the key using 
• less faults AND
• faults buried deeper inside the algorithm 
– some critical parts such as first/last round benefit from increased 
protection...
• AND much more cryptanalysis
– Part 2. will have to become much more sophisticated. 
• example: in the present work, there is a need to develop a lot of 
dedicated software…Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Related Work 
At CHES 2009, Matthieu Rivain (greatly improving on Akkar’04) 
explores fault attacks on DES middle rounds with statistical treatment: 
• Decrypt back 1 round 
– look at 4 bits at time (one S-box)
• Check the distribution 
of 4 bits in L15 Å L’15: 
– Q: is it “more” biased or 
“more” close to uniform?
• Square Euclidian Imbalance
Rivain’09 results are extremely good, 
10-20 faults at L12 allow  
to recover the full key.
L15
f
R15
L16 R16
fault occurred 
before
6 bits
4 bits
known ciphertext outputFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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More CHES 2009
Examples: they need 10..20000 faults at rounds 
12..10.
Remark: These figures assumed that it is possible to ‘reliably enough’
perturbate just one half of DES state. Future countermeasures might  Future countermeasures might  Future countermeasures might 
make it difficult. make it difficult. make it difficult.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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More CHES 2009
They conclude that 
IF one can do 20 000 faults 
THEN the last 7 rounds must be protected now.
A big mistake, let us correct it: A big mistake, let us correct it: A big mistake, let us correct it:
IF one can do  IF one can do  IF one can do 1 1 1 fault,  fault,  fault, 
THEN the last  THEN the last  THEN the last 16 16 16 rounds must be protected rounds must be protected rounds must be protected.  .  . 
What? Let us explain. What? Let us explain. What? Let us explain.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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More CHES 2009 More CHES 2009 More CHES 2009
They conclude that  They conclude that  They conclude that 
IF one can do 20 000 faults 
THEN the last 7 rounds must be protected now.
A big mistake, let us correct it:
IF one can do 1 fault, 
THEN the last 16 rounds must be protected. 
What? Let us explain.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Background
Cryptanalysis has two main branches:
• Statistical
– Requires a lot of data, processing can be fast
• Algebraic / Logical
– Requires less data, but very hard computational problems arise (NP-
hard problems). 
– Brute force is sometimes a FEASIBLE substitute, and the reference 
point to improve on. Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Algebraic Cryptanalysis [Shannon]
Breaking a « good » cipher should require:
“as much work as solving a system of 
simultaneous equations in a large number 
of unknowns of a complex type”
[Shannon, 1949]Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Results on DES
Nicolas T. Courtois and Gregory V. Bard: 
Algebraic Cryptanalysis of the D.E.S.
In IMA conference 2007, pp. 152-169, 
LNCS 4887, Springer. 
See also: 
eprint.iacr.org/2006/402/Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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What Can Be Done ?
Method: ANF-to-CNF + MiniSat algorithm: 
Key recovery for 6 rounds of DES. 
Only 1 KP (!).
No other attack works with 1 KP.
Method are slightly improved since 2007.
Now we can break 7 rounds with 1 KP…Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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How to Do It?
Key recovery for 6-7 rounds. Only 1 KP.
How to Do It?
• Step 1. Represent DES as a system of equations.
• Step 2. Convert to a SAT problems.
• Step 3. Solve by a SAT solver.
All the steps are non-trivial. Previous research gives 
some very good methods to achieve it. Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Attack: Step 1
One idea: 
• each DES S-box is written as a system of 
cubic equations.
• Many other methods also work…
Like adding 40 extra variables, much simpler equations (“/opns method”).
• And many other, see IMA 2007 paper…
– Free software to generate suitable encodings of DES can be obtained from Nicolas Courtois or 
downloaded from www.cryptosystem.net/aes/toyciphers.htmlFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Attack: Step 2
Convert an algebraic system 
to a SAT problem.
• Ready software to do conversion can be downloaded from 
www.cryptosystem.net/aes/tools.html
• Best method here: “local interpolation”.
• • • At the end of the day, DES S At the end of the day, DES S At the end of the day, DES S- - -boxes are represented by many clauses of length 10. boxes are represented by many clauses of length 10. boxes are represented by many clauses of length 10.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Attack: Step 3
Solve the SAT problem.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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3.1.  MiniSat 2.0. 
Winner of SAT-Race 2006 competition.
An open-source SAT solver package, 
by Niklas Eén, Niklas Sörensson, 
http://www.cs.chalmers.se/Cs/
Research/FormalMethods/MiniSat/Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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3.2.  Ready Software for Windows
Several ready programs to solve SAT 
problems are also available on the same 
web page:
www.cryptosystem.net/aes/tools.htmlFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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3.3. 
SAT Solvers
in the Cloud
solving SAT 
problems
on demand…
commercial 
but also for free…Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Why These Methods 
These methods are suitable for handling sophisticated fault 
attacks because:
1. These are the ONLY cryptanalytic attacks known which 
work when the attack disposes of only 1 or a few 
encrypted texts
2. They only work for a limited number of rounds, but in fault 
attacks precisely the complexity is frequently less than the 
whole cipher, because only a part of internal state is 
modified.  Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Our Simulations 
we present some preliminary results.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Fault Model 
At present moment we assume that the fault is known 
for example one bit or one byte flipped. 
The attacker needs to either 
• guess which are flipped 
• or control very well his perturbation.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Basic situation
Example of a fault attack – solve the whole: 
12
rounds
12
rounds
12
rounds
4
rounds
4
rounds
4
rounds
P
P
P
C1
C2
C3
I
I
IFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Ignore the Left
solve OR check for consistency : 
4
rounds
4
rounds
4
rounds
C1
C2
C3
I
I
IFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Example 
(not doing anything very exciting yet)
Flipping 1 bit affecting S-box S1 in round 16. 
Fact: with about 2-3 faulty ciphertexts we get enough 
information to recover 6 bits of the key. 
Much more faults are needed to recover the whole DES key.
Yet hope is not lost. 
Remark: Due to diffusion if DES, 
if we flip 1 bit in round say 13, 
we hope to affect ALL S-boxes in round 16. Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Diffusion => Less Faults but Harder 
If we flip 1 bit in round say 13, 
we hope to affect ALL S-boxes in round 16. 
So maybe the whole key recovery is possible with 1 single 
faulty ciphertext? This is our “Holy Grail”: 1 single fault. 
Claim: Even if the attacker can do just one fault, he should 
NOT do it in round 16, even if he could. 
He should maybe aim at round 13. 
We don’t quite get there, we use 2,4,8 faults for example.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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The Hardest Case
consistent?
solve for key bits?
4
rounds
4
rounds
C1
C2
I
IFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Wanted 
Efficient automated solvers and/or consistency tests 
for a few rounds of DES. Able to handle the whole 
complex situation.
In our research we are interested in attacks slightly faster than 
brute force. 
• Our attacks involve guessing some key bits, than either we determine other key bits or find a 
contradiction.
– Rule of thumb: if we guess 20 key bits, any attack faster than 2 hours, will break DES faster than by brute force. 
– For 3DES attacks in like 260 are also possible, will still break 3DES in practice. 
For now, 
our best attacks are full key recovery attacks 
via solving a SAT problem.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Current Attacks
full key recovery
4
rounds
4
rounds
4
rounds
C1
C2
C3
I
I
IFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Similar Work at UCL Belgium 
• “using a single leakage trace”, 
• AES and PRESENT
1. “Combining Algebraic and Side-Channel Cryptanalysis 
against Block Ciphers”
• preprint by Mathieu Renauld, François-Xavier Standaert
2. “Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks on the AES: Why Time 
also Matters in DPA”
• preprint by Mathieu Renauld, François-Xavier Standaert and 
Nicolas Veyrat-CharvillonFault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Our Results 
Example 1:
We break DES with 2 faulty ciphertexts with 2 bits flipped, at round 14.
Guessing 20 key bits. Time to recover the key = 0.01 h.
Overall about 200 times faster than brute force.
However in order to use only 1 fault at round 14 unless we need to produce 
a precise fault on 10 bits, much harder to produce. 
Surprise: Yet as explained before, due to more diffusion and more key bits 
being involved, 1 faulty ciphertext works very well at round 13.
Example 2:
We Break DES with 1 faulty ciphertext with 2 bits flipped, at round 13.
Guessing 24 key bits. Time to recover the key = 0.01 h.
About 10 times faster than brute force.
Remark: the only input of our program is a pair of ciphertexts, the plaintext is not used at all.
Note: an exe file to re-run  the simulations presented here can be obtained from Nicolas Courtois.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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More by Brute Force! 
While these attacks can be improved, 
this one is already feasible today:
If the DFA attackers does 256 DES computations, 
which is feasible for anybody with FPGA implementation 
and a budget of say 20 K USD, then a fault attack 
anywhere inside last 16 rounds is feasible. 
Just one fault is needed.
Due to the fact that the last DES uses a 56-bit key.Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Conclusion
At CHES 2009 Rivain shows that:
IF one can do 20 000 faults 
THEN the last 7 rounds must be protected now.
But in the real life, with standard countermeasures, 
the attacker can only hope to induce a few faults
per card…Fault Attacks on Inner Rounds Courtois Jackson Ware
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Conclusion
Few faults per card? This will be enough. 
He just needs more computers/FPGA, 
and key recovery will be feasible with:
– algebraic attacks based on experimentation with 
sophisticated “solver” software
– or even simply brute force 
With just 1 single fault in any of the 16 last rounds
one can recover 3DES keys from smart cards in 
practice.